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Background: Local mosquito-borne Zika virus (ZIKV) transmission has been reported in two counties in the
contiguous United States (US), prompting the issuance of travel, prevention, and testing guidance across the
contiguous US. Large uncertainty, however, surrounds the quantification of the actual risk of ZIKV introduction
and autochthonous transmission across different areas of the US.
Methods: We present a framework for the projection of ZIKV autochthonous transmission in the contiguous
US during the 2015–2016 epidemic using a data-driven stochastic and spatial epidemic model accounting for
seasonal, environmental, and detailed population data. The model generates an ensemble of travel-related
case counts and simulates their potential to have triggered local transmission at the individual level in the
2015–2016 ZIKV epidemic.
Results: We estimate the risk of ZIKV introduction and local transmission at the county level and at the 0.025° × 0.025°
cell level across the contiguous US. We provide a risk measure based on the probability of observing local transmission
in a specific location during a ZIKV epidemic modeled after the epidemic observed during the years 2015–2016. The
high spatial and temporal resolution of the model allows us to generate statistical estimates of the number of ZIKV
introductions leading to local transmission in each location. We find that the risk was spatially heterogeneously
distributed and concentrated in a few specific areas that account for less than 1% of the contiguous US population.
Locations in Texas and Florida that have actually experienced local ZIKV transmission were among the places at
highest risk according to our results. We also provide an analysis of the key determinants for local transmission and
identify the key introduction routes and their contributions to ZIKV transmission in the contiguous US.
Conclusions: This framework provides quantitative risk estimates, fully captures the stochasticity of ZIKV introduction
events, and is not biased by the under-ascertainment of cases due to asymptomatic cases. It provides general
information on key risk determinants and data with potential uses in defining public health recommendations and
guidance about ZIKV risk in the US.
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From 2015 to 2016, the Zika virus (ZIKV) epidemic
spread across most countries in the Americas, including
the United States (US) [1–3]. As of July 3, 2018, three US
territories, including Puerto Rico, have reported 37,255
ZIKV cases mostly due to widespread local transmission
[3, 4]. Laboratory evidence of possible ZIKV infections
has been found in 4900 pregnant women from US terri-
tories, 167 of whom have had pregnancy outcomes with
ZIKV-related birth defects [3, 5, 6]. The US states and Dis-
trict of Columbia have reported 5710 travel-associated
ZIKV cases, including 2474 pregnant women with evi-
dence of ZIKV infection and 116 ZIKV-related birth de-
fects [3]. Two geographical locations have experienced
local transmission of ZIKV in the contiguous US:
Miami-Dade County, in Florida, and Cameron County, in
Texas [7, 8]. While the outbreaks in Florida and Texas
were limited, the indirect impact on the local economy
has been remarkable [9].
Concerns have been raised that several other locations
in the contiguous US were at risk of ZIKV transmission,
thus triggering a number of studies aimed at identifying
populations at highest risk of local transmission [10–20].
In particular, detailed studies based on environmental suit-
ability, epidemiological factors, and travel-related case im-
portations have been used to estimate the risk for specific
counties in the US [21, 22]. In this study, we quantify the
risk of local ZIKV transmission by using a data-driven sto-
chastic and spatial epidemic model accounting for sea-
sonal, environmental, and detailed population data. The
model also accounts for the association between socioeco-
nomic status and the risk of exposure to mosquitoes, and
it has been previously used to estimate the introduction of
Zika in the Americas and the spatial and temporal dynam-
ics of the epidemic [23]. By using an extensive likelihood
analysis with data from places with a reliable epidemio-
logical surveillance system, the model generates a stochas-
tic ensemble of simulations estimating the place and time
of introduction of ZIKV in Brazil and the unfolding of the
epidemic in the Americas. For each simulation, the
individual-level scale of the model allows for the construc-
tion of daily travel-related case counts (TCCs) tracking
the number of infected individuals in the contiguous US
at the county level and at the finer spatial resolution of
0.025° × 0.025° corresponding approximately to 2.5 km ×
2.5 km cells, comparable in size to the ZIKV active trans-
mission areas identified in Florida by the Centers for Dis-
ease Control and Prevention (CDC) [24]. Using the time
series of county-specific TCCs and the mechanistic trans-
mission model, it is possible to estimate the probability
that a specific location would experience local ZIKV
transmission during the 2015–2016 time window. The
methodology proposed here provides a statistical estimate
of ZIKV transmission risk that is not biased by theunder-ascertainment of infections and the single historical
occurrence of the case importation timeline that fail to ac-
count for the full stochasticity of transmission. The TCC
database also allows us to identify key sources and routes
of ZIKV introductions. Results from our study can provide
guidance to public health agencies in their efforts to iden-
tify populations and seasons at high risk of ZIKV trans-
mission, so that resources towards outbreak prevention
and response can be allocated more efficiently.
Methods
We consider three major factors associated with local
ZIKV transmission in the contiguous US: the intensity
of travel-related infection importations, the environmen-
tal suitability for ZIKV transmission, and the socioeco-
nomic risk of exposure to mosquitoes. In this study, we
develop a data-driven computational framework (Fig. 1)
to quantitatively account for these three factors and to
evaluate their impact on ZIKV transmission. Based on
this framework, we assess the risk of local ZIKV trans-
mission across the contiguous US through the full
course of the 2015–2016 ZIKV epidemic.
The starting point of our methodology is the construc-
tion of a synthetic database of TCC entering the US
through airport transportation hubs. The database is
generated from simulations based on a large-scale spatial
model simulating the 2015–2016 ZIKV epidemics, where
both symptomatic and asymptomatic ZIKV infections
are considered [23]. The synthetic database of TCC con-
tains for each infected individual the time of arrival,
stage of ZIKV infection, airports of origin and arrival,
and location of residence in the contiguous US1 [25]. A
schematic sample of the database is shown in Table 1.
Each infected individual’s likelihood of exposure to mos-
quito bites and his/her capability of triggering local ZIKV
transmission is affected by the ecological presence of mos-
quitoes in his/her location of residence. Indeed, our model
integrates mosquito abundance data (Ae. aegypti and Ae.
albopictus) [26, 27] that takes into account for
temperature suitability, precipitation, vegetation, and
urbanization and considers seasonal variations in the mos-
quito density determined by daily temperature. The indi-
vidual’s socioeconomic status, which is strongly associated
with factors such as sanitation conditions, accessibility to
air conditioning, and level of disease awareness, also af-
fects the likelihood of exposure to mosquitoes [14, 28, 29].
Our computational framework considers a data layer
based on global socioeconomic indicators [30], which is
calibrated with historical mosquito-borne disease out-
breaks in naive populations to provide a likelihood map of
the individual’s exposure to mosquitoes [23]. This map
serves as a spatial filter (Fig. 1c-II) that probabilistically se-
lects individuals exposed to mosquito bites down to the
resolution of a 0.25° × 0.25° cell containing his/her location
AB C
D
Fig. 1 A schematic illustration of the computational framework to assess the risk of ZIKV introductions into the contiguous US. a High-resolution (0.025° ×
0.025°∼2.5 km× 2.5 km) population density map [59] and Voronoi tessellation of the contiguous US into census areas with a major airport transportation
hub at each of their centers [60]. b An example of the census area centered at Miami International Airport. c I: Travel-associated ZIKV infections entering
the Miami International Airport. Location of residence of each ZIKV infection is randomly assigned with likelihood proportional to the population density
within each census area. II: The probabilistic filter of the risk of exposure to mosquitoes due to socioeconomic factors such as housing
conditions, sanitation, and disease awareness. III: Spatiotemporal specific ZIKV transmission dynamics are influenced by environmental
factors that are temperature sensitive, including the spatial distribution of Aedes mosquitoes, seasonal mosquito abundance, and ZIKV
transmissibility. d Compartmental stochastic ZIKV transmission model used to evaluate the environmental suitability of ZIKV transmission.
Humans are divided into susceptible SH, exposed EH, infectious IH, and recovered RH compartments, and mosquitoes are divided into
susceptible SV, exposed EV, and infectious IV compartments
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potentially trigger detectable local ZIKV transmissions
(Fig. 1c-III, d), according to the stochastic mechanistic
ZIKV transmission model that takes into account mos-
quito abundance, the current temperature in the area, and
the transmission dynamics of ZIKV (see Additional file 1:
Supplementary Information). We define a detectable local
transmission as the generation of 20 or more autochthon-
ous transmission infections triggered by a single ZIKV in-
fection introduction. Smaller outbreaks would likely go
unnoticed assuming a 5% to 10% detection rate of infec-
tions due to the large proportion of asymptomatic cases
[31–33]. Due to fine spatial and temporal resolution, the
transmission model is able to account for the significant
variability in the ZIKV basic reproduction number (R0)
across locations, as well as the variability within the same
location at different times. These differences in R0 are
driven by temperature and the mosquito abundance,
among other variables. The details of the mechanisticTable 1 A sample of the database containing simulated travel-relate
Case ID Time of arrival Airport of
arrival
Stag
0001 2015-12-01 MIA Exp
0101 2016-07-15 JFK Infe
0212 2016-11-23 MIA Infemodel and the calculation of the socioeconomic risk of ex-
posure to mosquitoes are reported in Additional file 1.
More technically, we can define the following procedure:
(1) We randomly sample one out of the simulated TCC
from the statistical ensemble output of the ZIKV
model [23].
(2) For each infected individual in the TCC, we
stochastically determine whether he/she is
potentially exposed to mosquito bites based on the
probability of exposure pe at the location of
residence x. pe is calibrated based on socioeconomic
indicators and x identifies a specific county or
spatial cell. In each location x, these individuals
could potentially trigger local transmission.
(3) Based on the individual’s stage of infection (exposed
or infectious), time of introduction, and location of
residence (at 0.025° × 0.025° resolution), we simulate
local ZIKV transmission with the same stochasticd ZIKV-infected individuals entering the US
e of infection Airport of
origin
Location of residence
(latitude, longitude)
osed BOG (25.864, − 80.257)
ctious SJU (40.729, − 73.991)
ctious SJU (25.808, − 80.130)
Sun et al. BMC Medicine          (2018) 16:195 Page 4 of 12transmission model used in the global model
(described in Additional file 1: Supplementary
Information) with the specific parameters calibrated
to each 0.25° × 0.25° cell in the US.
(4) For each simulated TCC, the above procedure
identifies all the infections triggering detectable
local transmission. For every time interval Δt and
geographical area x of interest, we can associate
variable n(x, Δt) = 1 if there is at least one imported
infection from the TCC that triggers detectable
local transmission, and n(x, Δt) = 0 otherwise.
In order to provide a probabilistic risk measurement,
we execute N = 106 resamplings from the ensemble of
simulated TCC generated by the model and repeat the
above procedure. The resampling procedure accounts
for the many possible TCCs compatible with the ob-
served ZIKV epidemic and stochastic effects in the local
transmission. This is because not all case importations
will result in local outbreaks, even in areas where trans-
mission is favored. The risk of local ZIKV transmission
for area x during time window Δt can be thus defined as
rtr x;Δtð Þ ¼ 1N
XN
i¼1
ni x;Δtð Þ ð1Þ
where i indexes the 106 outcomes from the resampled
TCCs. This definition of the risk can be aggregated at
various spatial (0.025° × 0.025°) and temporal resolutions
(≥ 1 day), and it can be used to generate risk maps of
ZIKV introduction across the contiguous US. Unless
otherwise specified, we consider in this study the local
transmission risk rtr(x) that is defined on the Δt
referring to the time window spanning from January 1,
2015 to December 31, 2016. This definition of risk can
be interpreted as the probability of observing a detect-
able local transmission in a specific area per ZIKV
epidemic.
Results
By using the methodology outlined in the previous sec-
tion, we provide quantitative estimates of rtr(x) both at
the county level and at 0.025° × 0.025° cell resolution.
Figure 2a shows the risk of ZIKV introduction at county
level in the contiguous US through the full course of the
simulated 2015–2016 ZIKV epidemics. We consider four
main brackets for the risk and the associated population
sizes. At the county level, the highest risk bracket rtr(x) >
0.5 includes only 0.71% of the total population in the
contiguous US. In these areas, one would expect to ob-
serve detectable local transmission events with a prob-
ability above 50% during the simulated 2015–2016 ZIKV
epidemic. Even when we extend the high-risk bracket to
include counties with rtr(x) > 1/8, this includes only2.56% of the total population in the contiguous US.
Thus, the risk of local transmission is extremely concen-
trated to specific geographical locations. Figure 2d shows
the population living in counties with different risk
brackets of ZIKV introduction and their percentage with
respect to the total population in the contiguous US.
The counties of Miami-Dade, Florida, and Cameron,
Texas, where local transmission was observed in the
year 2016, were both estimated to be high-risk locations
(risk bracket, greater than 1/4). Densely populated areas
along the Gulf Coast also show up as high-risk locations,
in agreement with estimates from other models [12].
The risk of ZIKV introduction and local transmission
rtr(x) is highly spatially heterogeneous (Fig. 2a, b). This
heterogeneity persists even within the state of Florida,
where most areas are estimated to be environmentally
suitable for ZIKV transmission all year long [12, 34].
This is mostly because of socioeconomic and local cli-
mate heterogeneities. At a spatial granularity of 0.025° ×
0.025°, it is possible to perform a statistical analysis of
the risk distribution. In Fig. 2c, we report the distribu-
tion of cell-specific risks rtr(x). The distribution has a
very right-skewed heavy tail extending over more than
four orders of magnitude, a clear signature of the large
heterogeneity of the risk in the contiguous US.
It is worth stressing that the source of ZIKV introduc-
tions in each location is time-dependent, since the TCC is
determined by both the magnitude of the epidemic in the
regions of the Americas affected by ZIKV and travel pat-
terns from these areas. Our model explicitly simulates indi-
vidual ZIKV-infected travelers, with detailed information
about the traveler’s origin and destination at the daily scale.
This allows us to decompose the relative contribution of
potential ZIKV introductions from different epidemic re-
gions and to identify routes of high risk with high spatio-
temporal resolution. In Table 2, we report the likelihood of
local ZIKV transmission in Miami-Dade, Florida, for the
year 2015 and 2016 triggered by infection importations
from the Caribbean, Central America and Mexico, and
South America. The likelihood accounts for intensity of
ZIKV transmission in epidemic regions, the travel volume
between the source regions and Miami-Dade, and the
time-dependent environmental suitability of local transmis-
sion in Miami-Dade. In Fig. 3, we report the daily risk of
ZIKV infections in Miami-Dade from different geographical
regions as well as the time-dependent relative contributions
of different regions to the risk throughout the years 2015
and 2016.
As shown in both Table 2 and Fig. 3, in 2015, countries
in the Caribbean and South America were major con-
tributors to ZIKV introduction risk in Miami-Dade. On
the other hand, countries in Central America and
Mexico became major contributors in 2016. This reflects
the fact that the ZIKV epidemic started earlier in South
Fig. 2 The cumulative risk of local ZIKV transmission in the contiguous US. The cumulative risk of local ZIKV transmission at different spatial
resolutions is evaluated through the full course of the simulated 2015–2016 ZIKV epidemic. a The cumulative risk map of local ZIKV transmission
for each county in the contiguous US. The color scale indicates for any given county the probability of experiencing at least one ZIKV outbreak
with more than 20 infections (details in Additional file 1). b High spatial resolution estimates (0.025° × 0.025°) of the cumulative risk of local ZIKV
transmission through the full course of the simulated 2015–2016 ZIKV epidemic. c The complementary cumulative distribution function of the
local ZIKV transmission risk for all 0.025° × 0.025°cells (on a log-log scale). The heavy tail feature of the distribution reflects strong spatial
heterogeneity in terms of local ZIKV transmission risk. d The total population in the counties of the US with different risk levels of local
ZIKV transmission and their percentage with respect to the total population in the contiguous US
Table 2 The likelihood of a given local ZIKV transmission event in Miami-Dade, Florida, from different geographical regions
(Caribbean, South America, Central America and Mexico) for the years 2015 and 2016
Region Year 2015 Year 2016
Likelihood (%) 95% CI (%) Likelihood (%) 95% CI (%)
Caribbean 43.81 (10.47–61.98) 40.15 (14.09–59.79)
South America 27.67 (27.87–78.42) 27.67 (16.10–47.31)
Central America and Mexico 10.50 (3.61–20.39) 30.02 (17.54–48.52)
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Fig. 3 A breakdown of local ZIKV transmission events by the geographical origins of travel-associated ZIKV infections in Miami-Dade, Florida. a–c
The daily average number of ZIKV imported infections per day that trigger outbreaks with more than 20 infections, originating from the
Caribbean, Central America and Mexico, and South America. d The relative contributions to the expected number of local ZIKV transmission events by
different geographical regions
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later on spread to countries in Central America and
Mexico. Caribbean countries, however, remained a major
source of infection importation in both 2015 and 2016.
This is possibly due to the high travel volumes between
Florida and the Caribbean, as well as high incidence rate
and weak seasonality of ZIKV transmission in that re-
gion. This is in line with epidemiological data fromFlorida’s Department of Health, as well as phylogenetic
analysis based on sequenced ZIKV genomes from both
infected humans and mosquitoes in Florida [35].
In Fig. 4, we zoom in on three representative areas to
disentangle the key determinants shaping the spatiotem-
poral risk of local ZIKV transmission. Panels a, b, and c in
Fig. 4 represent geographical areas covering Miami-Dade,
Florida; Cameron, Texas; and New York City, New York.
A B C
Fig. 4 Factors which co-shape the spatiotemporal risk of local ZIKV transmission in three different regions in the contiguous US. Columns from
left to right represent a Miami-Dade, Florida; b Cameron, Texas; and c New York City, New York. Row 1 shows the average daily number of
imported ZIKV infections. Note that for Cameron, Texas, the scale on the y-axis is different than that of Miami-Dade, Florida, and NYC, New York.
Row 2 shows the average number of imported ZIKV infections that pass through the socioeconomic filter pe and reside in areas potentially
exposed to mosquitoes. Row 3 shows the basic reproduction number (weekly average) calculated based on the ZIKV transmission model. Gray-
shaded time windows indicate when the basic reproduction number R0 > 1 and sustainable ZIKV transmission is possible. Row 4 shows the
expected daily number of ZIKV introductions with the red-shaded time window indicating the estimated time of local ZIKV transmission based
on phylogenetic analysis [35]. Row 5 shows the average cumulative number of local ZIKV transmission events since January 1, 2015
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volume of ZIKV infection importations due to high popu-
lation density and close proximity to major international
transportation hubs. Cameron, Texas, on the other hand,
had far fewer ZIKV infection importations. However, due
to socioeconomic factor (among other factors), the popu-
lation in Cameron, Texas, is more likely to be exposed to
mosquitoes than the populations of Miami-Dade and New
York City. Consequently, the volume of Cameron’simported infections that were exposed to mosquito bites
is comparable to those of Miami-Dade and New York
City.
The environmental suitability of ZIKV transmission in
the three areas is remarkably different. The basic
reproduction number R0 is above the epidemic threshold
(R0 > 1) in Miami-Dade throughout the year, indicating
ZIKV transmission is environmentally suitable all year
long. Cameron, Texas, has moderate environmental
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seasons. New York City is far less environmentally suitable
for ZIKV transmission, with a narrow time window of ap-
proximately 2 months during summer when R0 is larger
than 1.
Given the individual-level resolution of the model, we
can focus on the daily average number of travel-associated
ZIKV infections leading to local transmission. This is a
different indicator than risk. The latter is defined as the
probability of observing at least one event of detectable
local transmission in the area, thus overlooking the num-
ber of different introduction events that trigger local
transmission. The profile of daily ZIKV introductions that
would lead to local transmission (Fig. 4, row 4) is jointly
shaped by ZIKV infection importations, socioeconomic
risk of exposure to mosquitoes, and the environmental
suitability of ZIKV transmission. The cumulative number
of ZIKV introductions leading to local transmission was
high in both Miami-Dade, Florida, and Cameron, Texas,
where local transmission occurred in the year 2016. The
time of ZIKV introduction in Miami-Dade, Florida, is esti-
mated to have occurred between January and May 2016
based on phylogenetic analysis of sequenced ZIKV ge-
nomes from infected patients and Ae. aegypti mosquitoes
[35]. Our model suggests (Fig. 4, row 4) high risk of ZIKV
introduction during the same time window, despite rela-
tively low environmental suitability. The high risk of intro-
duction in Miami-Dade between January and May 2016
was mainly driven by a high influx of imported ZIKV in-
fections. Based on our simulations, Miami-Dade county
has on average 1.29 cumulative introductions leading to
local transmission events (95%CI (0–9)) throughout 2015
and 2016 (Fig. 4, row 5, insert). However, the distribution
of the number of introductions is positively skewed (skew-
ness γ1 = 4.40), with a maximum of 55 introductions. This
indicates the possibility of multiple introductions during
the ZIKV outbreak in Miami-Dade, Florida, in line with
estimates from phylogenetic analysis [35].
To investigate to what extent the spatial variation of
local ZIKV transmission is driven by key socioeconomic
and environmental determinants, we first consider a re-
gression model exploring the relation between the aver-
age number of local ZIKV transmissions (log(ntr) is the
dependent variable) and three key determinants: the
number of ZIKV importations, average temperature, and
the GDP per capita. Specifically, the explanatory vari-
ables include:
 log(Nim), the logarithm of the cumulative average
number of TCC for each 0.25° × 0.25° cell from
January 1, 2015, to December 31, 2016.
 log( f20°), the logarithm of the fraction of days over
the year with an average temperature larger than
20 °C for each 0.25° × 0.25° cell. log(GDP), the gross domestic product per capita in
terms of purchasing power parity for each 0.25° ×
0.25° cell.
In Table 3, we show that if all three explanatory vari-
ables are included in the regression (model 1), the model
can explain 73.9% of the variance in the number of aver-
age introductions leading to local transmission in each
cell x. While only considering log(Nim) and log(f20° )
(model 2), we can explain 56.2% of the variance, and
using log(Nim) (model 3) alone can explain 47.5% of the
variance. It is worth remarking that such a simple statis-
tical analysis cannot fully explain the variance of log(ntr)
due to the nonlinear dependency between ZIKV trans-
mission, vector population dynamics, and temperature.
It is also due to the highly nonlinear nature of the dis-
ease transmission dynamics captured by the epidemic
threshold (where the basic reproduction number (R0)
needs to be larger than one to be able to spread in a
population). In addition, more than 90% of the geo-
graphical areas in the contiguous US are not included in
the regression because the simulations project no local
transmission events in those areas. However, 77% (in
terms of areas) of these “risk-free” areas are not environ-
mentally suitable for ZIKV transmission according to
our model.
To better illustrate the role of the three main drivers
of Zika transmission, we conduct a sensitivity analysis
considering three counterfactual scenarios. In each
counterfactual scenario, we modify one of the three
drivers across the contiguous US to uniformly mimic the
conditions in Miami-Dade, Florida, while keeping the
other two drivers intact. Specifically:
 In counterfactual scenario 1, the environmental
suitability (the temperature and thus all
temperature-modulated disease parameters) and so-
cioeconomic risk of exposure remain the same, while
for all airports in the US, the ZIKV infection impor-
tations are set to be the same as those of the airport
in Miami-Dade, Florida.
 In counterfactual scenario 2, the ZIKV infection
importations and the socioeconomic risk of
exposure to mosquitoes remain the same. However,
in this scenario, the temperature and consequently
all temperature-modulated parameters of ZIKV
transmission model across the contiguous US are set
to be the same as those in Miami-Dade, Florida.
 In counterfactual scenario 3, the ZIKV infection
importations and the environmental suitability are
kept intact, while the socioeconomic risks of
exposure to mosquitoes across the contiguous US
are set to be the same as that in Miami-Dade,
Florida.
Table 3 Regression analysis between log(ntr) and explanatory variables including log(Nim), log(f20° ), and log(GDP )
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
log(Nim) 0.72
∗∗∗ (0.69, 0.74) 0.48∗∗∗ (0.45, 0.51) 0.49∗∗∗ (0.46, 0.52)
log(f20°) 2.18
∗∗∗ (1.89, 2.48) 3.40∗∗∗ (3.01, 3.78)
log(GDP) − 13.29∗∗∗ (− 14.20, − 12.38)
R squared 74.9% 57.9% 47.5%
In model 1, all three explanatory variables log(Nim), log(f20°), and log(GDP) are included. Model 2 includes log(Nim) and log(f20° ). Model 3 only includes log(Nim).
For each model, we report the regression coefficient (95% CI) for each of the explanatory variables along with R squared, based on n = 1220 cells
ntr average number of local ZIKV transmissions within each 0.25° × 0.25° cell from January 1, 2015, to December 31, 2016, Nim number of ZIKV importations, f20°
fraction of days with temperature higher than 20 °C, GDP gross domestic product per capita in purchasing power parity
***p < 0.001
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peat the analysis performed with the real data and gener-
ate the cumulative county-level risk map of local ZIKV
transmission during the years 2015–2016 (see Add-
itional file 1: Supplementary Information, Section 4). All
three risk maps of the counterfactual scenarios are dis-
tinctly different from the risk map of Fig. 2a. Particu-
larly, in counterfactual scenario 1, under unrealistic high
intensity of ZIKV infection importations, all areas with
overlapping favorable environmental and socioeconomic
determinants are at high risk of local ZIKV transmission.
In counterfactual scenario 2, with unrealistic favorable
environmental suitabilities of ZIKV across the US, the
areas at high risk are no longer restricted to the proxim-
ity of the US southern border. Many counties with low
average yearly temperature and absence of Aedes mos-
quitos in the real world present significant risks of local
ZIKV transmission. In counterfactual scenario 3, with
high socioeconomic status equivalent to Miami-Dade,
Florida, both southern Texas and populated areas along
the Gulf Coast were relieved from high probability of en-
countering Zika, leaving southern Florida as the only
focus of high risk. Thus, all three drivers are necessarily
required to evaluate the risk of local ZIKV transmission
in the contiguous US.
Discussion
A prominent feature of our findings is the spatiotemporal
heterogeneity of ZIKV transmission risk across the con-
tiguous US. Spatially, our model estimates that approxi-
mately 68.9% of the people in the contiguous US live in
areas that are environmentally suitable for ZIKV transmis-
sion, in line with other models’ estimates [36]. However,
taking all ZIKV introduction and transmission determi-
nants into consideration, areas with non-negligible risk
(greater than 1/8) are concentrated in densely populated
areas along the Gulf Coast, capturing 2.56% of the US
population. From a temporal perspective, certain areas ex-
perience strong seasonality of ZIKV environmental suitabil-
ity, with a narrow time window when ZIKV transmission is
possible. Given limited resources, identifying seasons and
regions of high risk may help guide resource allocation forhigh-risk population screening, intervention, and vector
control. Our model is also able to identify the high-risk
routes of ZIKV importations through air travel. Imported
infections originating from Caribbean countries served as a
major contributor to trigger local ZIKV transmission in
Florida. Although it has the highest number of estimated
ZIKV infections among all countries, Brazil is not a major
contributor overall (5.75% of potential introductions leading
to local transmission across the contiguous US). This is due
to Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo, two of the largest transpor-
tation hubs in Brazil which make up 65% of the inter-
national travel to US from Brazil, being located in the
Southern region where ZIKV transmission activity is rela-
tively low. In addition, Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo have
the opposite seasonality compared to the contiguous US.
When it is environmentally suitable for ZIKV transmission
in Rio de Janerio and Sao Paulo, it is not suitable for ZIKV
transmission in most of the US. Thus, imported ZIKV in-
fections from Brazil were less likely to fuel potential trans-
missions in the US.
Our model also suggests that in Miami-Dade, Florida, the
overall risk of ZIKV introduction in 2015 is comparable to
that in 2016, while local transmission is only observed in
2016. This could be explained by the stochasticity of trans-
mission events. Another possibility is that because of the
high asymptomatic rate of ZIKV infections, limited local
transmission events occurred in 2015 without being picked
up by the surveillance system. Awareness of ZIKV was low
in 2015 as the World Health Organization declared ZIKV
as a Public Health Emergency of International Concerns
only in early 2016. Around the same time, the CDC an-
nounced a Health Alert Network advisory for Zika virus
[3], marking the start of active monitoring of ZIKV activ-
ities in the US.
The proposed model has several limitations. The high
volume of cruise ship stops along coastal areas of Florida to
the Caribbean may elevate the risk of ZIKV transmissions
beyond what is estimated in our model. Sexual transmis-
sion and transmission through other routes, not considered
by our model, may facilitate the risk of local transmission
even further. From January 1, 2015, to August 9, 2017,
there were 49 reported ZIKV cases in the contiguous US
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sion [3, 37–39]. This indicates that a larger population may
be affected by ZIKV [40–42]. In addition, ZIKV RNA was
detected in semen as long as 92 days after symptom onset
and is able to be sexually transmitted 31–42 days after
symptom onset [43]. ZIKV’s ability to persist in infected
males and the potential to infect through sexual transmis-
sion long after symptom onset are troublesome. However,
the specific risk through sexual transmission or other trans-
mission routes are not well understood, and the overall im-
pact of ZIKV infections acquired through other routes
remains unclear. As such, we do not include them in our
study [44]. Risk of exposure to mosquitoes associated with
socioeconomic factors is widely recognized but poorly
quantified. In our model, we utilize seroprevalence studies
from nine chikungunya outbreaks on confined, naive popu-
lations to estimate this association, in line with other ap-
proaches used to estimate the ZIKV attack rate [14].
Further studies however are needed to advance our under-
standing of the association between risk of exposure to
mosquitoes and socioeconomic status.
Our model assumes the mosquito abundance is expli-
citly modulated by temperature, since many studies sug-
gest that temperature is the main driver of the seasonal
variation of mosquito abundance [45–48]. The effect of
rainfall as an environmental driver is indirectly included
into our model through incorporating the mosquito pres-
ence data created by Kraemer et al. [27]. The study sug-
gests that for both Ae. aegypti and Ae. albopictus,
maximum and minimum precipitation make significant
contributions to explain the spatial distribution of Aedes
mosquitoes, consequently affecting the environmental
suitability of local ZIKV transmission. However, a full
mechanistic modeling of the influence of rainfall (i.e., daily
timescale) on the mosquito lifecycle, while interesting, is
still out of reach on a global scale. Along with rainfall, hu-
man water supplies may also affect the availability of stag-
nant water, especially in urban settings [45, 49]. Without
controlling for the effect of human water supplies, the ef-
fect of precipitation could be positive [50–52], negative
[53], or no effect at all [54, 55]. In Additional file 1: Sup-
plementary Information, we provide a figure illustrating
the seasonal abundance provided by our model.
In our model, we consider both Ae. aegpyti and Ae. albo-
pictus as competent vectors to transmit the ZIKV. How-
ever, the competence of Ae. albopictus to transmit ZIKV is
debated, and the notable differences in the spatial distribu-
tions of Ae. aegpyti and Ae. albopictus make it crucial for
evaluating the global risk of ZIKV [27, 56]. However, these
differences are less relevant when limiting the risk assess-
ment within the spatial range of the contiguous US. This is
because the geographical distribution of the environmental
suitability of Ae. aegpyti and Ae. albopictus is largely over-
lapping within the contiguous US, based on the studies byJohnson et al. [57]. The environmental suitability distribu-
tion of Ae. albopictus extends a bit further north when
compared to that of Ae. aegpyti. In the areas where only Ae.
albopictus are present, the overall environmental suitability
of ZIKV transmission is very low due to the presence of
strong seasonality, and our model estimates that those areas
would have minimal risk of experiencing local ZIKV trans-
mission in the years 2015–2016 (Fig. 2).
In 2017–2018, ZIKV transmission activities in most
countries throughout the Americas has plummeted [2], in
agreement with model estimates [23, 58]. The risk of
ZIKV introduction in the contiguous US would be ex-
pected to be negligible as imported infections triggering
the local transmission would be drastically reduced. How-
ever, one should exercise caution as vector-transmitted
diseases are known to show strong spatial heterogeneity
and seasonality and are affected by socioeconomic factors.
The stochastic nature of ZIKV transmission could leave a
considerable amount of naive populations living in regions
at risk of ZIKV transmission. Furthermore, expansion of
the Aedes mosquito distribution, human migration, and
shifts in socioeconomic status could lead to more popula-
tions being at risk for local ZIKV transmission. It is more
likely that ZIKV transmission activities in the future may
resemble the current situation of chikungunya, where
transmission activities could flare up sporadically. The
possible sporadic outbreaks of ZIKV would continue to
pose a risk to the contiguous US, where most of the popu-
lation is naive to the virus and a large fraction live in areas
environmentally suitable for ZIKV transmission.
Conclusion
In this study, we show that the overall risk of ZIKV
introduction and local transmission during the 2015–
2016 outbreak is jointly determined by the intensity of
ZIKV importations, environmental suitability for ZIKV
transmissions, and the socioeconomic risk of exposure
to mosquitoes. Our estimates suggest that the risk of
ZIKV introductions has a very strong spatial and tem-
poral heterogeneity. The areas in the contiguous US at
non-negligible risk (that is, greater than 1/8) only ac-
count for 2.6% of the total population in the contiguous
US. The model is able to identify the hotspots for ZIKV
introductions, and it reveals the relative contributions of
ZIKV introductions from different geographical regions
over time. The results of our study have the potential to
guide the development of ZIKV prevention and response
strategies in the contiguous US.
Endnotes
1Although there has been reporting in the media about
the traffic to and from Latin and Caribbean countries,
airline traffic in 2016 has been stable with a mere 4.4%
increase.
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